你可能很懂理財,也可能一竅不通。以下的10個理財觀念,對任何人都可適用,掌握這些原則與方法,幫你作出正確的理財抉擇。
1. 看財經局勢,做趨勢計畫
相信你有過這樣的經驗:看了今天的財經局勢所做出的投資決策,往往事後證明是錯誤的決定。當股市大壞、房地產價格創新低、市場上每天都有利空消息、所有人都要退出投資行列時,正是起漲的開始,為什麼歷史一再重演,而投資人總是學不會?
這是因為多數人會被短期的消息影響其長期的決定,而導致錯誤的結論。假設你買進股票或共同基金是為了十年後給子女留學使用,那麼你會在乎是今天買進還是明天買進嗎?又或者你會為今天哪家公司跳票就賣出,明天護盤基金進場又急急忙忙買進嗎?
如果你經常觀看股市解盤的節目,你是否仔細想過:這些老師也許說對了明天的行情,讓你做出買進或賣出的動作,但你是否檢驗過:今日的投資行為一年半載,或是三、五年後來看,還是正確的嗎?也許你賣在最高點,賺到十五%,但卻錯失了日後漲升一倍,甚至數倍的利潤。記住,投資是看好標的之未來性,不要隨著一時消息起舞。
2.不要只為了賺錢而投資
很多人以為,只要投資就一定能致富,因此一味挑選獲利可觀的投資工具。如果你經歷過股市從萬點向下反轉,短短時間內就跌了三、五成,甚至有些股票最後只剩最高價時一成的價格,大概就能體會什麼是投資風險了。
投資不單純只是為了獲利,其更積極的意義應是管理及運用金錢,使既有的資本發揮更大的效益。不管外在環境好或壞,你都必須理財,所以更需要對風險控管有所瞭解。
風險是指投資價值變動的幅度,只要投資,一定就有風險;因為價值會變動,投資也才有意義。有風險並不是一件壞事,想要有投資報酬,就得承擔風險,就像給花澆水一樣:不澆水,花會枯萎;澆太多水,花也活不了。
3.用情緒理財是最失敗的策略 投資人都知道不要追高殺低,但投資行為往往重蹈覆轍,就是因為無法克服情緒性的問題。看到股票大漲、別人都在賺錢時,就忍不住跳進去而套在高檔;手中股票總認為還會再漲,等到價格一跌再跌,才只好忍痛認賠出場。
一般人最容易有的情緒問題就是貪婪。每個人都希望短時間內就能發財,所以,通常只會看到賺錢機會,而忽略了其背後所隱含的風險,或是不會見好就收,賺到可觀的收益還不滿足,只想還有超額利潤,結果不僅該賺的沒有賺到,還賠得更多。投資人必須控制的另一種情緒就是恐懼。人們經常為了一時的消息而影響投資判斷力,也忘了原本的投資目標而自亂陣腳,計畫要持有三、五年的股票,可能一時股價大跌就急急忙忙脫手,因而損失慘重。
第三個情緒問題是人們往往根據最近投資經驗來預估未來的投資收益。其實投資環境隨時在變,假設某一年投資組合因為較為投機而成績特別好,並不表示年年可如此操作;反之,今年成績不理想,不代表投資決策錯誤,必須調整組合內容而涉入較高風險的投資。 最怕的是,一時的高獲利讓投資人迷失了方向,而導致日後更嚴重的問題。一點點貪心和焦慮並不是壞事,畢竟人性的弱點是不可避免的,重要的是,要認清這個事實,儘量控制及降低其負面的影響。
4.不要再認為買房子是最佳的投資增值選擇
通常買房子除了自用之外,購屋者總認為房地產一定會增值,所以窮畢生之力只想擁有自己的房子,並認為這就是最好的投資,對其他投資工具都不屑一顧。也許你聽說過朋友房子轉手賺了數倍利潤,那多半是因為運用財務槓桿所致,然而,如果投資其他工具也使用財物槓桿,可能同樣會有高獲利的情形發生。所以,如果排除財務槓桿效果,房地產未必是投資報酬最佳的管道,再加上持有成本及流動性考量,精打細算下來,投資報酬率不見得有想像中那麼高。尤其近年來國內房地產供給量居高不下,房價漲幅相當有限;即使像日本一向高房價的國家,房地產價格也一再走低,台灣未來房價全面大漲的可能性值得商榷。所以,不要認為買房子就已經是最重要的投資決策,就可以高枕無憂;購屋的主要目的是為了居住、住得舒適,如果你認為這是投資行為,在花費大筆金額投資之前,應該與其他工具仔細作比較,三思而後行。
5.薪資高不代表將累積更多財富 多數人常常為了另一份薪資較高的工作而跳槽,但職場上的成功是不是意味著財富累積也會更多?這可能要看個人如何規劃自己的財務。
假設兩個同樣大學畢業的同學,一位進入公家機構,一位在民營企業服務。兩人起薪都是三萬元,都工作到六十歲退休。
前者一直工作到退休都沒有轉換工作,每年平均領十三個月的薪資,平均薪資調幅為五%,退休後每月可領退休前薪資的六五%。後者平均每五年換一次工作,每次約加薪十五%,每年平均領十五個月的薪資,但服務機構都沒有提供退休金,退休後只能靠自己累積的儲蓄過日子。
這是十分典型的例子,就全面的、長期的理財規划來看,何者較為成功?一直轉換工作、尋求更好的待遇,也許意味工作上的成功,可以過更寬裕的生活,也有更大的花費。如果不審慎累積財富、創造財富,一旦沒有收入,生活可能過得十分拮据而完全無法適應。你可以選擇汲汲營營的追求工作和薪水的成就感,也可以穩當過一生。薪資收入的高低,不能代表財富就有多少,賺較少的錢不見得不能累積財富,過平穩無憂的生活。
6.負債記錄不要變得太完美
有些人以為從不負債的人就是信用最好,一定就可以在金融機夠借到最高額度,享有最優惠的利率,其實不然。如果沒有信用記錄可循,通常金融機構的審查反而趨向保守。很多人申請了信用卡卻備而不用,這對你的信用記錄也沒有助益,最好是保有少數幾家用得到的信用卡即可。不要以為自己絕不可能向銀行借錢,而不在意信用記錄的維持。平時就應適度使用信用卡,不要遲繳費用,把用不到的信用卡取消;在申請貸款前,先將信用卡的已使用額度降低,以便借到較多的金額。
7.開銷不要以百元為單位,要計畫到每一塊錢
人們買房子、汽車或其他高價的物品時,都懂得比價、議價,以省下可觀的金額,但卻在日常生活中不經意花掉十元、二十元,你可知道這些隨手可存下來的小錢累積到退休的時候,會是多大的財富?
假設你每天能省下五十元,這不過是少買一包零食和一杯飲料就可以辦到,這樣每月可累積1500元,並將它存在銀行,保持這樣的存錢習慣直到退休,假設有三十年的期間,平均年利率八%,屆時,你就有二二四萬的退休金可用!
如果你每天能存一百元,累積的財富就是四四七萬元!你每天花掉五十元可能一點也不心疼,但如果你知道這是在放棄一筆二二四萬元的財富累積,是不是就會謹慎些?不需要經過每日、每月的精算,也不必嚴格控制支出項目,從現在開始,當你進入便利商店或逛超市時,將不必要買的東西放回去,把這些錢存進銀行,你就可以真真實實看到自己財富的增長!
8.不要只是存錢,要用「滾雪球方式」存錢 控制消費慾望是一種省錢、存錢的方式,但如果讓你的錢花在一些可以幫助你省錢、甚至賺錢的工具或技能學習上,財富累積速度就會像滾雪球一般。
如果你每天都花七十元坐計程車上、下班,也許買一部腳踏車代步會幫你省下不少的交通費,還可省下上健身房的費用;如果你的手工藝不錯,買一部縫紉機就可以作家中所需的擺飾品、窗簾、桌墊,甚至可能的話,還可放在朋友的商店出售;喜歡盆栽的人不妨考慮種一些既可玩賞、又有實用價值的植物,譬如番茄、九層塔等可以食用的水果菜類;購買一本理財的書籍或刊物,其中省錢用錢、賺錢投資的觀念,對財富的增長多少有所助益。
按照這樣的原則,你也可以想出更多具有創意的點子。你不一定要成為小氣財神,而是在用錢時多想想:花這筆錢對我的理財有幫助嗎?這是最佳指導原則。
9.停止在小孩身上與假日期間過度的浪費
重視下一代的培育以及休閒活動,是現代人主要的特色之一。如果你仔細算一算家中支出,不難發現,花在小孩身上的費用和休閒娛樂支出比重日益上升,因為這是讓人最捨得花錢的兩大理由,而且通常人們只著重在這方面的計畫,而不在意將會產生多大的花費。逛街、外出用餐、出國旅遊,這些都是犒賞自己常用的方法,其結果可能都所費不貲。對兒女有求必應,並處心積慮讓他們學習更多才藝,是現代父母的通病,因此,養育一個孩子也越來越貴了。
其實,這些花費在心理上的滿足往往大過實質上的需求,如果稍微用點心,用一些方法加以克制,立刻可以省下可觀的費用。
9-1列出支出明細--減少情緒性的消費行為,儘可能事前列出花費的項目,更重要的是列出支出金額,加總之後你就知道是否負擔得起這些花費。
9-2少刷卡,用現金--只帶預算內的金額出門。刷卡的消費者通常等收到帳單才知道已經透支,而使用現金可以馬上知道荷包已經變薄,或是還剩多少錢可以使用。
9-3讓小孩和你一起省錢--教導子女金錢的價值及正確使用途徑,訂下一些規則讓他們遵守,譬如:不必給零用錢,而是作好某些事情才給予獎勵;教他們存錢、省錢、花錢、投資觀念等。
10.不要花大錢購買價值會逐漸下降的物品
你會不會因為朋友買了某件名牌的衣物或手錶,所以也跟著買?你有沒有因為刷信用卡的便利,而買了一些原本負擔不起的東西?許多高價的商品,不是因為本身價值如此,而是讓人達到心理上的滿足,試問,這些滿足感可以持續多久?三、四十年後你還會戴這隻錶、穿這件衣服嗎?
當初如果把這些錢存起來,現在的價值已經倍增。現代人將享受生活列為重要的生活目標,但這並不表示可以過超過能力所及的物質生活,否則就會變成外表上很富裕,其實一點財富基礎都沒有。
結論:理財首重保本,能夠保本並有足夠的本錢再進一步投資,才能跳脫還款壓力,提供以上十項法則與諸位分享。
趙夫子
2014/02/21
Guan Seng
Guan Seng Khoo, PhD
Head, ERM, GRC at Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo)
Thank you both. As long as all of us are comfortable with the "local" definition, without getting too detailed or preoccupied with the semantics, e.g., often CDSs create the illusion of risk "transfer", when in reality, risk transformation has its unintended consequences................, I'm happy to agree and disagree!
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- 19 days ago
James Andrae likes thisDonald J.
Donald J. Riggin, CPCU, ARM
CEO, ART of Captives Consulting LLC
Indeed, an interesting discussion. At the end of the day it's just semantics, as Guan Seng Khoo has observed. I'm quite familiar with the non-insurance methods of transferring risk, but I think that risk transfer, regardless of technique, is just one thing: Moving negative financial outcomes from one party to another.
Think of the concept of risk having 2 separate and distinct properties, (1) potentially negative financial outcomes, and (2) one of the consequences of life: business activities, property ownership, driving a car, crossing the street, getting out of bed, and so on. All we can do is mitigate some of the negative financial consequences; insurance being the most prevalent risk transfer tool. The first property of risk is binary; the risk is either retained or transferred. Even the most onerous legal disputes between insurer and client as to whether or not a loss is compensable eventually settle if favor of one of the two litigants, (except Jaundyce v. Jaundyce).
Regarding the illusion of risk as mentioned above; it's an illusion because in reality some risk transfer schemes are just as likely to fail as to not fail, such as a CDS. But a CDS, just like an insurance policy, does indeed transfer the financial consequences of risk to a counterparty, but its value as a risk transfer tool is a matter of degree. Compared to the security available through a highly rated insurance company, a CDS's volatility and susceptibility to market risk greatly reduces its efficacy as a pure risk transfer tool. If the risk transferor isn't aware of this, well, that's his problem.
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- 19 days ago
Guan Seng Khoo, PhD, Edward Chao and 1 other like thisGuan Seng
Guan Seng Khoo, PhD
Head, ERM, GRC at Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo)
Thanks Donald. I guess where I'm coming from is when the term is used outside of the insurance industry as in the typical COSO ERM or ISO 31K framework, where it's often used in the context of risk "reduction", which I don't believe in, or in banking, when instruments in the banking book are transformed into the trading book, e.g., via securitization.
But thanks again to everyone for sharing here. Have a marvellous week.
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- 18 days ago
James Andrae likes thisKathryn M
Kathryn M Tominey
Owner, Red Mountain Consulting, LLC
Just a thought, legalisms aside, if you lack capability to perform mission (product or service) essential work and outsource you are still accountable to clients and shareholders. Many CEOs & mgt teams are indifferent to this as long as they collect their annual bonus - based on very short term results.
You do remember why we had to bailout AIG don't you? Making book via naked CDSs without understanding underlying products which had ratings - arguably fradulent ratings - suggesting high quality.
Anyone putting that much effort into acquiring financial insurance is sending a message about how much they believe in their product.
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- 18 days ago
Edward Chao, James Andrae like thisGuan Seng
Guan Seng Khoo, PhD
Head, ERM, GRC at Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo)
Thanks, Kathryn, that's what I was alluding to in my CDS' comment, together with the roles played by monolines, e.g. AMBAC, etc.
James
James Andrae
Risk Management Specialist
Donald, very solid legal points. I love a good philosophical discussion. It is as always a matter of semantics and perspective. Our experiences may be different, I don't believe it makes either of us more right or wrong. It does however open the mind to other perspectives which is always a good thing.
Insurance while a risk transfer mechanism actually creates other risks as you alluded. Credit, Legal, Cost, Timing. Kathryn above raised very important valid points. Perspectives, agendas, rorts, etc.
Risk Management should always try to minimise reliance on the legal process if things go wrong. (This is why I spend way too much time analysing contracts). While the process marches along, in the meantime a company may be seriously negatively affected, face bankruptcy at the extreme, share price fluctuations, credit downgrades etc. Bonuses not paid, people fired.
It always becomes a matter of size of the insurance claim, 100K not much of a problem, $100M is often open to "debate" in the court system. My experience is that CEOs and Boards don't like the court process and always look for heads to roll.
From a risk management perspective that's not good enough because of the domino effect on business' other activities that assume cash flows will be made whole in the proper time. Very few companies have a few "lazy" hundred million just hanging around. I repeat the best risk you have is the one you don't have and there are numerous examples from physical power plants to the financial markets.
In the financial markets, peculation aside, hedging can cause new and some unforseen linked risks. There is a famous issue now about a company being trading a commodity and having 40 - 50% of the liquidity in that market. They got it right, but could not get out of their trades. Greed. The best risk is the risk you don't have. Don't expect the market to accept losses when you are the major provider of liquidity. Stick to a lower threshold. If a company is that big that it needs 50% of the market liquidity then it need to review its operational risk management to account for the lack of reliance on the market hedges.
The GFC and Asian Crisis were in essence, liquidity and counterparty credit issues on the whole.
Power plants often have unexpected failures, these are insurable events. The major condition is the proper maintenance of the plant. One man's process is another man's negligence. We can understand that the insurance company will rightly want to verify everything before maybe paying. There are cases where a 1 week shutdown took 2 years and longer to pay. The claims are mostly for physical damage and financial loss. This could easily climb to $100M+ depending. Repairing a power plant may cost $5M the losses on a SWAP could be any amount perhaps a further $95M. No COB is keen on this sort of risk.
The best risk is the one you don't have. Solution don't over commit power plant transaction SWAPS such that if it failed apart from the burden of repairs you will also have the financial SWAP payments to make. There is nothing lost except for speculative revenue and that could go either way.
Building infrastructure creates volumes of possible risks to the owner. Power plants can be built by the power company or by an external engineering firm. This transfers most of the risks but some do remain. Two major risks are that the generator will not work to specifications, or be completed on time. The power company contract specifies Ts&Cs that if not met they simply don't accept the new generator. So the "lemon" risk as well as others are not theirs. The best risk is the one you don't have.
While your points are valid Market Risk Managers do not live in a post risk world but in a pre risk world.
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- 17 days ago
Guan Seng Khoo, PhD, Edward Chao like thisJames
James Andrae
Risk Management Specialist
It took some companies over 7 years to get paid 6c on the dollar after Enron failed. Reliance on the legal system, while just, did not make the participants whole. Insurance failures were kept commercially private so we will never know if the losses were covered or not. The best risk you have is the one you don't have. When the CEO and CFO of a fortune 50 company resign suddenly. Smart risk managers closed out positions and watched the debacle with amusement and got bonus.
If entering into a trade with a counterparty is reliant on a CDS for risk mitigation, then the best risk is the one you don't have. 1 don't enter into the trade to begin with. 2 Don't pay any bonus until the expiry or closure of the contract. Implement #2 and a whole lot of needless exposures are removed because the traders now have some skin in the game.
You stated “If the risk transferor isn't aware of this, well, that's his problem”. In a perfect world with perfect knowledge maybe. The global financial system is based on the blind hope that the other guy will “play by the rules” and be there to make you whole regardless of whether it is an insurance contract or swap. Blind hope because you can never see the true picture of the other counterparty, and, well, let’s leave the Credit Agency discussion to one side. It’s not only the illusion of risk but of transfer. The Transferors prior to the GFC had no idea who was really on the other end of the majority of the CDS deals. How was it their fault?
Market risk managers understand these limitations and on the whole tend to limit exposures as much as possible.
Of course you can't have no risks. You can even die in your bed sleeping.
But you should understand the domino factors in all risks and come back with the trade off scenarios and limit these whenever possible.
The point I think Edward is raising is to test whether risk managers understand that no risk is ever truly transferred or mitigated completely, so how do we live with that reality, post GFC.
I am certain that if the Central Banks and Finance Ministers had not stepped into the GFC, the global meltdown could have sent economies spiralling worse than the Great Depression. That was the risk they did not want to have.
They saved the world from calamity but also let some companies that could not be absorbed, fail.
This was the wake up call. Edward is asking if we have altered our thinking since.
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- 17 days ago
Guan Seng Khoo, PhD, Edward Chao like this