你可能很懂理財,也可能一竅不通。以下的10個理財觀念,對任何人都可適用,掌握這些原則與方法,幫你作出正確的理財抉擇。
1. 看財經局勢,做趨勢計畫
2.不要只為了賺錢而投資
3.用情緒理財是最失敗的策略
趙夫子
2014/02/21
With half a decade’s hindsight, it is clear the crisis had multiple causes. The most obvious is the financiers themselves—especially the irrationally exuberant Anglo-Saxon sort, who claimed to have found a way to banish risk when in fact they had simply lost track of it. Central bankers and other regulators also bear blame, for it was they who tolerated this folly. The macroeconomic backdrop was important, too. The “Great Moderation”—years of low inflation and stable growth—fostered complacency and risk-taking. A “savings glut” in Asia pushed down global interest rates. Some research also implicates European banks, which borrowed greedily in American money markets before the crisis and used the funds to buy dodgy securities. All these factors came together to foster a surge of debt in what seemed to have become a less risky world.
II. Starting with the folly of the financiers.
The years before the crisis saw a flood of irresponsible mortgage lending in America. Loans were doled out to “subprime” borrowers with poor credit histories who struggled to repay them. These risky mortgages were passed on to financial engineers at the big banks, who turned them into supposedly low-risk securities by putting large numbers of them together in pools. Pooling works when the risks of each loan are uncorrelated. The big banks argued that the property markets in different American cities would rise and fall independently of one another. But this proved wrong. Starting in 2006, America suffered a nationwide house-price slump.
The pooled mortgages were used to back securities known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which were sliced into tranches by degree of exposure to default. Investors bought the safer tranches because they trusted the triple-A credit ratings assigned by agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. This was another mistake. The agencies were paid by, and so beholden to, the banks that created the CDOs. They were far too generous in their assessments of them.
Investors sought out these securitised products because they appeared to be relatively safe while providing higher returns in a world of low interest rates. Economists still disagree over whether these low rates were the result of central bankers’ mistakes or broader shifts in the world economy. Some accuse the Fed of keeping short-term rates too low, pulling longer-term mortgage rates down with them. The Fed’s defenders shift the blame to the savings glut—the surfeit of saving over investment in emerging economies, especially China. That capital flooded into safe American-government bonds, driving down interest rates.
Low interest rates created an incentive for banks, hedge funds and other investors to hunt for riskier assets that offered higher returns. They also made it profitable for such outfits to borrow and use the extra cash to amplify their investments, on the assumption that the returns would exceed the cost of borrowing. The low volatility of the Great Moderation increased the temptation to “leverage” in this way. If short-term interest rates are low but unstable, investors will hesitate before leveraging their bets. But if rates appear stable, investors will take the risk of borrowing in the money markets to buy longer-dated, higher-yielding securities. That is indeed what happened.
III. From houses to money markets, a chain reaction exposed fragilities in the financial system.
When America’s housing market turned, a chain reaction exposed fragilities in the financial system. Pooling and other clever financial engineering did not provide investors with the promised protection. Mortgage-backed securities slumped in value, if they could be valued at all. Supposedly safe CDOs turned out to be worthless, despite the ratings agencies’ seal of approval. It became difficult to sell suspect assets at almost any price, or to use them as collateral for the short-term funding that so many banks relied on. Fire-sale prices, in turn, instantly dented banks’ capital thanks to “mark-to-market” accounting rules, which required them to revalue their assets at current prices and thus acknowledge losses on paper that might never actually be incurred.
Trust, the ultimate glue of all financial systems, began to dissolve in 2007—a year before Lehman’s bankruptcy—as banks started questioning the viability of their counterparties. They and other sources of wholesale funding began to withhold short-term credit, causing those most reliant on it to founder. Northern Rock, a British mortgage lender, was an early casualty in the autumn of 2007.
Complex chains of debt between counterparties were vulnerable to just one link breaking. Financial instruments such as credit-default swaps (in which the seller agrees to compensate the buyer if a third party defaults on a loan) that were meant to spread risk turned out to concentrate it. AIG, an American insurance giant buckled within days of the Lehman bankruptcy under the weight of the expansive credit-risk protection it had sold. The whole system was revealed to have been built on flimsy foundations: banks had allowed their balance-sheets to bloat (see chart 1), but set aside too little capital to absorb losses. In effect they had bet on themselves with borrowed money, a gamble that had paid off in good times but proved catastrophic in bad.
IV. Regulators asleep at the wheel, failures in finance were at the heart of the crash.
Failures in finance were at the heart of the crash. But bankers were not the only people to blame. Central bankers and other regulators bear responsibility too, for mishandling the crisis, for failing to keep economic imbalances in check and for failing to exercise proper oversight of financial institutions.
The regulators’ most dramatic error was to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt. This multiplied the panic in markets. Suddenly, nobody trusted anybody, so nobody would lend. Non-financial companies, unable to rely on being able to borrow to pay suppliers or workers, froze spending in order to hoard cash, causing a seizure in the real economy. Ironically, the decision to stand back and allow Lehman to go bankrupt resulted in more government intervention, not less. To stem the consequent panic, regulators had to rescue scores of other companies.
But the regulators made mistakes long before the Lehman bankruptcy, most notably by tolerating global current-account imbalances and the housing bubbles that they helped to inflate. Central bankers had long expressed concerns about America’s big deficit and the offsetting capital inflows from Asia’s excess savings. Ben Bernanke highlighted the savings glut in early 2005, a year before he took over as chairman of the Fed from Alan Greenspan. But the focus on net capital flows from Asia left a blind spot for the much bigger gross capital flows from European banks. They bought lots of dodgy American securities, financing their purchases in large part by borrowing from American money-market funds.
In other words, although Europeans claimed to be innocent victims of Anglo-Saxon excess, their banks were actually in the thick of things. The creation of the euro prompted an extraordinary expansion of the financial sector both within the euro area and in nearby banking hubs such as London and Switzerland. Recent research by Hyun Song Shin, an economist at Princeton University, has focused on the European role in fomenting the crisis. The glut that caused America’s loose credit conditions before the crisis, he argues, was in global banking rather than in world savings.
Moreover, Europe had its own internal imbalances that proved just as significant as those between America and China. Southern European economies racked up huge current-account deficits in the first decade of the euro while countries in northern Europe ran offsetting surpluses. The imbalances were financed by credit flows from the euro-zone core to the overheated housing markets of countries like Spain and Ireland. The euro crisis has in this respect been a continuation of the financial crisis by other means, as markets have agonised over the weaknesses of European banks loaded with bad debts following property busts.
Central banks could have done more to address all this. The Fed made no attempt to stem the housing bubble. The European Central Bank did nothing to restrain the credit surge on the periphery, believing (wrongly) that current-account imbalances did not matter in a monetary union. The Bank of England, having lost control over banking supervision when it was made independent in 1997, took a mistakenly narrow view of its responsibility to maintain financial stability.
Central bankers insist that it would have been difficult to temper the housing and credit boom through higher interest rates. Perhaps so, but they had other regulatory tools at their disposal, such as lowering maximum loan-to-value ratios for mortgages, or demanding that banks should set aside more capital.
Lax capital ratios proved the biggest shortcoming. Since 1988 a committee of central bankers and supervisors meeting in Basel has negotiated international rules for the minimum amount of capital banks must hold relative to their assets. But these rules did not define capital strictly enough, which let banks smuggle in forms of debt that did not have the same loss-absorbing capacity as equity.
Under pressure from shareholders to increase returns, banks operated with minimal equity, leaving them vulnerable if things went wrong. And from the mid-1990s they were allowed more and more to use their own internal models to assess risk—in effect setting their own capital requirements. Predictably, they judged their assets to be ever safer, allowing balance-sheets to balloon without a commensurate rise in capital (see chart 2).
The Basel committee also did not make any rules regarding the share of a bank’s assets that should be liquid. And it failed to set up a mechanism to allow a big international bank to go bust without causing the rest of the system to seize up.
IV. The long period of economic and price stability over which they presided encouraged risk-taking.
The regulatory reforms that have since been pushed through at Basel read as an extended mea culpa by central bankers for getting things so grievously wrong before the financial crisis. But regulators and bankers were not alone in making misjudgments. When economies are doing well there are powerful political pressures not to rock the boat. With inflation at bay central bankers could not appeal to their usual rationale for spoiling the party. The long period of economic and price stability over which they presided encouraged risk-taking. And as so often in the history of financial crashes, humble consumers also joined in the collective delusion that lasting prosperity could be built on ever-bigger piles of debt.
新加坡解散國會 9月11日提前大選 | |||
曼谷記者林以君∕廿五日電/聯合報/104.08.26 | |||
新加坡總統陳慶炎廿五日宣布接受總理李顯龍建議解散國會,陳慶炎並頒佈選舉令,將於九月一日提名,九月十一日舉行第十三屆大選。建國總理李光耀三月辭世,這是星國第一次沒有李光耀的大選,也是星國首度於周五舉行大選投票,當天將放假。 決定下個50年方向 總理李顯龍在臉書上說,他早上建議總統頒布選舉令和宣布解散國會,並表示這次大選是要尋求新加坡人民委託,進而跨入下一個「金禧年(五十年)」,籲請選民支持他及他的團隊。李顯龍表示,「新加坡人民不只在這次大選中選出未來五年治理新加坡的領導人,也將選出大家在未來十五到廿年合作的團隊,也設定了新加坡下一個五十年的發展方向。」 候選人這次大選將競逐八十九個國會席次,共有十三個單選區和十六個集選區。選民人數為二百四十六萬九百七十七人。李光耀與同期政治精英一手建立的各項制度,將面臨新世代選民要求更民主的考驗。 人民行動黨(PAP)自一九五九年新加坡是自治邦時代成為執政黨後,至今都是執政黨。新加坡國會議員任期五年,因此依法李顯龍必須在明年一月前解散國會改選。二○一一年上屆大選PAP雖在八十七席中拿下八十席,得票率百分之六十點一四卻是史上最低,在野的工人黨拿下七席則是歷史新高。移民大量湧入和生活費飆高引發民怨,被視為主因。 執政黨面臨大考驗 PAP本屆面臨的考驗更高,連從政近四十年的前總理、榮譽資政吳作棟,都宣布繼續參選。民調顯示星國民眾對政府的「滿意指數」在七月仍高達百分之七十六點四,但對於生活費的滿意指數只有百分之四十二,住房則為百分之五十三,交通是百分之五十七。 新加坡管理大學法學院副教授陳慶文指出,外籍移民和星國中產階級搶工作、搶住房和大眾運輸工具:「過去這四年,PAP竭盡全力處理這些重要且敏感的議題。假如選民還是給予反對黨更多支持,將代表選民希望大有為的政府,也知道反對黨健全的價值。」 http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0006/284075/web/index.html#2L-6301723L |
亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(英語:Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,縮寫:AIIB),簡稱亞投行,是一個向亞洲國家和地區政府提供資金以支持基礎設施建設之區域多邊開發機構,成立旨在促進亞洲區域的建設互聯互通化和經濟一體化的進程,並且加強中國及其他亞洲國家和地區的合作。總部將設在中國北京市,法定資本為1,000億美元。[2]
中華人民共和國主席習近平於2013年10月2日在雅加逹同印度尼西亞總統蘇西洛舉行會談時首次倡議籌建亞投行。[3]2014年10月24日,中國、印度、新加坡等21國在北京正式簽署《籌建亞投行備忘錄》,[2] 印度尼西亞(印尼)於2014年11月25日簽署備忘錄,成為亞投行第22個意向創始成員國。[4]
2015年3月12日,英國正式申請作為意向創始成員國加入亞投行,[5]成為首個正式申請加入亞投行的歐洲國家及主要西方國家。[6]隨後,法國、義大利、德國等西方國家紛紛以意向創始成員國身份申請加入亞投行。[7]在接收新意向創始成員國申請截止日期3月31日前,韓國[8]、俄羅斯[9]、巴西[10]等域內國家和重要新興經濟體也紛紛申請成為亞投行的意向創始成員國。
2015年4月15日,亞投行意向創始成員國確定為57個,其中域內國家37個、域外國家20個。[11]東南亞國家協會(東協)10國全數加入,擁有28個成員國的歐洲聯盟(歐盟)有14國加入,20國集團(G20)中也有14國加入,而金磚5國則全部躋身首發陣容,[12]其他國家和地區今後仍可以作為普通成員加入亞投行。各國將於2015年年中完成亞投行章程談判並簽署,年底前完成章程生效程序,正式成立亞洲基礎設施投資銀行。[13]
2014年10月24日,21個國家在北京正式簽署籌建亞投行備忘錄[2]。印尼雖派員列席,但因政府換屆,延遲至當年11月25日才於雅加逹正式簽署,成為第22個意向創始成員國[4]。 | |||
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根據現有章程,《籌建亞投行備忘錄》已經明確了各項參數的上下限:亞投行的法定資本為1000億美元,初始認繳資本目標為500億美元左右,實繳資本為認繳資本的20%。並且亞投行多邊臨時秘書處秘書長金立群也做出了「在初創階段,中國的出資額最高可達50%」的保證。而根據日本媒體的推算,中國的出資額約為35%~40%,即使日本加入亞投行亦不會低於30%。
國家與地區 | 估算投入 | 估算最少實繳資本 |
---|---|---|
![]() | 500億美元[96] | 100億美元 |
![]() | 1兆韓元 (約9.1億美元)[98] | 2000億韓元 (約1.8億美元) |
![]() | <30億美元[99] | <6億美元 |
亞投行是國際發展領域的新成員、新夥伴,在亞洲基礎設施融資需求巨大的情況下,由於定位和業務重點不同,亞投行與現有多邊開發銀行是互補而非競爭關係。亞投行側重於基礎設施建設,而現有的世界銀行(世行)、亞洲開發銀行(亞行)等多邊開發銀行則強調以減貧為主要宗旨。從歷史經驗看,包括亞洲開發銀行和歐洲復興開發銀行在內的區域性多邊開發銀行的設立,不僅沒有削弱世界銀行等現有多邊開發銀行的影響力,而且增強了多邊開發性金融的整體力量,更有力地推動了全球經濟的發展。[13]
在亞投行籌建以及未來運作過程中,中國都將積極推動亞投行與世界銀行、亞洲開發銀行等現有多邊開發銀行在創用CC、能力建設、人員交流、項目融資等方面開展合作,共同提高本地區基礎設施融資水平,促進本地區的經濟和社會發展。作為世界銀行、亞洲開發銀行的重要股東國,中國也將一如既往地支持現有多邊開發銀行在促進全球減貧和發展事業方面做出積極貢獻。[13]
亞投行將致力於促進亞洲地區基礎設施建設和互聯互通,其中包括「一帶一路」沿線亞投行成員國的相關基礎設施建設項目。中方也非常歡迎世界銀行、亞洲開發銀行等機構積極參與「一帶一路」相關項目。 [13]
籌建亞投行倡議提出以來,世行行長金墉、國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)總裁拉加德和亞行行長中尾武彥分別在多個場合表態積極支持籌建亞投行,表示將與亞投行開展合作。世行、亞行等多邊開發銀行已與亞投行籌建多邊臨時秘書處建立了工作聯繫,在許多方面給予了支持。作為亞投行發起國和世行、亞行重要股東國,在亞投行籌建以及未來運作過程中,中國都將積極推動亞投行與世行、亞行等現有多邊開發銀行在創用CC、能力建設、人員交流、項目融資等方面開展合作,共同提高本地區基礎設施融資水平,促進本地區的經濟和社會發展。[11]
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歐洲央行QE啟動:1.1兆歐元量化寬鬆(QE)政策 | |||
綜合報導/聯合報/104.03.09 | |||
歐洲央行(ECB)九日將啟動市場期待已久的一點一兆歐元(約台幣卅八兆元)量化寬鬆(QE)措施,這可能是刺激歐元區成長與避免通縮的最後良機。 歐洲央行總裁德拉基五日宣布本周正式啟動每月購買約六百億歐元公共與民間債券,至少延續至明年九月。這項措施等同透過電子方式印鈔,利用這些貨幣收購各國發行的債券,藉此壓低公債與其他金融資產的利率,使企業能以便宜成本舉債與投資,進而提高支出與聘僱。 為達上述目的,歐洲央行將在民間銀行、投資與退休基金、保險公司與其他主要公債投資人所交易的次級市場中,買進歐元區成員國公債。 然而,歐洲央行QE計畫的債券收購與曝險卻牽涉大量政治角力。為平息德國與北歐國家堅決反對QE立場,這次大部分的購債行動將由歐元區內各國央行執行,而且幾乎只會買進本國政府發行的公債,以討好德國,德國因此免於陷入須紓困其他國家的情勢。 歐元上周因QE計畫細節出爐,十一年來首度貶破一歐元兌一點一美元。分析師認為,再加上美國經濟轉強因素,預測歐元兌美元將在今年底貶至一比一。 隨著美國、日本等各國央行先後採取QE政策,對阿拉伯世界甚具影響力的「阿拉伯資金(Arabianmoney)」網站指出,全球負殖利率公債總額已經增加到四兆美元,預料目前股市、債市泡沫遲早會破滅,建議投資人購買黃金保值。 該網站報導,全球資金氾濫,大量湧向公債等「安全天堂」,使負殖利率公債總額激增,德國、法國、日本及其他十幾國的公債投資人在借錢給這些國家的政府時,反而要自己「倒貼錢」。ECB九日開始操作QE,會把最貴的公債抬得更高。至於股市,現在任何人都能以低利取得貸款,再把資金投入到不斷膨脹的股市以迅速獲利。然而終有一天股市泡沫也將崩潰,唯一的問題只在於何時會發生而已。 該網站強調,目前雖然「美元是王」,但也是將美元轉為黃金的最好機會。 http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0008/274731/web/index.html#2L-5637305L |
英國匯豐銀瑞士分行助逃稅 28億涉台 | |||
編譯李京倫∕報導/聯合報 | |||
美國華府「國際調查記者聯盟」(ICIJ)八日指控,英國匯豐集團旗下的瑞士私人銀行協助兩百多國客戶逃稅,涉及的帳戶總金額共計一千一百九十億美元(約台幣三兆七千億元),直到二○○七年為止。匯豐股價九日在倫敦交易所早盤下跌百分之一點七。 ICIJ發布的報告涵蓋兩百零三國,若以金額排名,與台灣有關的帳戶金額為八千八百六十萬美元(約廿八億台幣),台灣排行第一百零七名;若以相關客戶數排名,七十三個客戶與台灣有關,台灣排行第八十七名。 ICIJ、法國世界報、英國衛報、英國廣播公司(BBC)電視節目「廣角鏡」與美國哥倫比亞廣播公司(CBS)電視節目「六十分鐘」八日共同發布報告指出,機密文件顯示,匯豐銀行人員不僅向客戶保證,匯豐不會把帳戶資料透露給客戶母國的稅務機關,還討論避稅方案。 匯豐人員在備忘錄上提到一個丹麥富豪時寫道:「帳戶持有人住在丹麥,要聯絡就找她住在倫敦的女兒,這很重要,因為擁有外國帳戶卻沒申報是犯罪行為。」在另一張備忘錄上,匯豐經理用代號「畫家」稱呼一個倫敦資本家,討論他和女友應如何逃掉義大利的稅。 報告顯示,客戶包括政治人物、演員、搖滾歌手和與軍火商、「血鑽石」商往來的人。血鑽石是指在戰區開採並銷往市場的鑽石,國際社會已禁售。 匯豐回應說,「近幾年我們採取重要步驟落實改革,婉拒不符匯豐嚴格新標準的客戶,包括在守法納稅方面讓我們有疑慮的人」,匯豐致力與稅務機關交換資訊。 機密文件最初由瑞士匯豐的資訊人員法恰尼取得,他現居法國,在瑞士面臨違反銀行保密法的刑事控訴。法恰尼把文件交給法國政府,法國世界報從一名調查人員手中取得文件,二○一○年,法國把這些資料分享給英、美等國的稅務機關,英、法、西班牙稅務機關因此共計追回約台幣兩百四十億元的稅款和罰款。 |
富人與窮人的時間觀
窮人為錢工作,富人讓錢為他們工作;
窮人管理金錢,富人卻善於管理時間;
富人時間不夠用,窮人不知如何殺時間。
時間在窮人手上變得一文不值,在富人手裡卻變得價值連城,
因此,窮人將會更窮,而富人也將更富。
為什麼每個人擁有的時間都一樣,但成就卻大不相同呢?你通常是花錢買時間還是賣時間賺錢?有人開車繞了半小時只為了找一個免費車位,有人花錢找人辦事讓自己可以做別的更重要的事。當時間不再只是度量衡而是有行有市可以買賣,你的時間值多少錢,你願意用多少錢買別人的時間,未來會有交易所,請先標好你的定價。
會管理時間就會管理金錢也會管理自己的人生,讓人生更精彩的關鍵就在於同樣的時間內透過規劃、分工可以做更多的事情,讓家庭、事業、婚姻、健康都能兼顧。
千萬不要讓遲到、懶惰,這些小事浪費在您寶貴時間上。
十個理財重要觀念
你可能很懂理財,也可能一竅不通。以下的10個理財觀念,對任何人都可適用,掌握這些原則與方法,幫你作出正確的理財抉擇。
1. 看財經局勢,做趨勢計畫