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by 趙永祥 2017-04-01 12:32:33, 回應(0), 人氣(57)


Business relationship responsibilities 

in the context of institutional investors


The OECD has previously concluded in a paper on the scope and application of business relationships in the financial sector that a relationship between an investor and investee company including a minority shareholding can be considered a "business relationship " under the OECD Guidelines.


Hence investors, even those with minority
shareholdings, may be directly linked to adverse impacts caused or contributed to by investee companies as a result of their ownership in, or management of, shares in the company causing or contributing to certain social or environmental impacts. In other words, the existence of RBC risks (potential impacts) or actual RBC impacts in an investor’s own portfolio means, in the vast majority of cases there is a “direct linkage” to its operations, products or services through this “business
relationship” with the investee company.

As a result, investors are expected to consider RBC risks throughout their investment process and to use their so-called “leverage” with companies they invest in to influence those investee companies to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts. However, investors are not responsible for addressing those adverse impacts themselves.


In some limited circumstances, adverse impacts caused by companies associated with an investment will not be directly linked to an investor’s own operations, products or services (e.g. their own portfolio). For example, in circumstances where an investor buys shares or other equity in a joint venture (JV) company,
it will have an investor-investee business relationship with that JV company. 


However, if one of the JV partners is causing/contributing to adverse impacts (e.g. forced labour) through a separate, unrelated project (i.e. which the investor has no investment, ownership or other connection with), the investor is not directly linked to the forced labour impacts through its investment in the JV. However since there may be a risk of similar behaviour in the projects operated by the JV company, if the investor becomes aware of this situation, it should trigger ‘heightened ongoing due diligence’ on the JV.
by 趙永祥 2017-01-11 08:08:35, 回應(0), 人氣(139)

Risk Management in China: Trends and Challenges for Banks



According to recent surveys, institutions recognize the need to enhance their risk management capability. 100% of firms surveyed recognize the need to improve the functionality of their existing risk management IT systems, 43% (especially banks) believe they must improve their business processes, and 29% recognize that their risk management capability can be significantly enhanced by adopting new risk management frameworks such as Basel III and Solvency II.

Banks are well capitalized, but deregulation and increased exposure to global market forces will drive risk management upgrades, such as CVA. Asset management companies require integrated, multiasset portfolio and risk management technologies in response to greater investor sophistication and a broad range of financial products. Securities firms face challenges of managing more complex, interconnected risks. In the report, Risk Management in China: Trends and Challenges for Banks and Securities Firms, the author will provide his viewpoints in the risk management challenges, trends, and methods in China.

In order to compete effectively on the global stage—and against both foreign and domestic competitors at home—financial institutions will need to develop world-class risk management capabilities. Firm-wide customer and counterparty views across investments and financial management and risk data repositories are critical for financial institutions.


by 趙永祥 2017-01-10 20:59:06, 回應(0), 人氣(117)

MNE Investment and Risk Management in China

This book mainly assesses the joint effects of diversification configuration on MNE performance and systematic risk. Findings suggest that their joint effects are curvillinear on performance and systematic risk. Furthermore, low level of region and moderate level of country diversification shows significant positive effect on MNE performance and negative effect on systematic risk.

We construct the terminology “balanced configuration in geographical diversification” to identify averaging the balance of geographical diversification between country and region via moderate concentrated China involvement is the optimal strategic diversification strategy to gain better performance and low risk.
附件: [隱藏]
by 趙永祥 2016-12-14 21:58:20, 回應(0), 人氣(96)


LinkedInEdward Chao 

As machines take our jobs, should everyone get a guaranteed income? Some early experiments look promising.

Peter Diamandis

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by 趙永祥 2016-12-08 21:03:24, 回應(0), 人氣(67)


Taiwan and China Economic Outlook (8-December-2016)


China - Investment Data- Growth maintains strength in Q3


China Investment Chart

China Investment October 2016 0

Note: Month-on-month changes of seasonally adjusted urban fixed-asset investment index and annual growth rate (year-to-date) in %.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). 

http://www.focus-economics.com/countries/china/news/pmi/upward-trend-in-manufacturing-pmi-remains-intact-in-november



Taiwan Economic Outlook


by 趙永祥 2016-10-16 22:39:04, 回應(0), 人氣(126)


ADB report

https://www.adb.org/publications/reports


https://www.adb.org/publications
by 趙永祥 2016-10-16 22:35:31, 回應(0), 人氣(248)


Does it really improve the lives of citizens
 
by enhancing government performance?



Public accountability demands that performance data be publicly available. But who actually uses the vast amount of information that is produced? Does it really improve the lives of citizens by enhancing government performance?

Reliable, timely data on inputs, outputs, activities, outcomes and, often, societal level measures are essential for effective and efficient governance.

For a reporting framework to be effective and sustained over time, nine lessons are proposed to be incorporated in the public reporting approach.

  • Measures should be grounded in a strategic vision or plan including desired future performance levels. Agencies should always be able to link their publicly reported indicators to either a government-wide or internal set of desired long-term results accompanied by a statement of how they intend to achieve those results.

  • A few good measures can go a long way toward understanding performance. A handful of well-crafted measures can go a long way toward understanding how well a government performs in a specific area.

  • Performance reports must be trustworthy. To be taken seriously by stakeholders, a purely government report requires some form of validation. Another important aspect of trustworthiness is consistency.

  • The information provided must matter to the boss. If it doesn’t matter to the chief elected official, it doesn’t matter.

  • Cater to the stakeholder groups that value the information. Generally, performance information targeted to some entity with a personal affiliation—an agency, a city or county, or an issue—generates the greatest interest.

  • Public performance reports should support a robust data analytics capability. A good performance report should include not only an explanation of data trends, but also provide analysis of causes and explore possible solutions to problematic trends.

  • Don’t assume that potential consumers of performance information will understand even the simplest of data presentations. Those in the performance reporting business must constantly go the extra mile to assure that data is understandable.

  • Just because you can measure it doesn’t mean you can manage it. Good measures are better than no measures, but these are only small contributing factors when implementing strategies to solve persistent societal issues addressed by governments and their partners.

  • Stakeholders matter. Reaching stakeholders that can make a difference should be part of the planning process for every government performance report from day one.
by 趙永祥 2015-11-12 21:36:33, 回應(0), 人氣(264)


A Conversation with Christine Lagarde on the Global Economy

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6f8E84ZLCtA


A Conversation with:
Christine Lagarde
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund

Moderated by:
Frederick Kempe
President and CEO
Atlantic Council

Please join us on Thursday, April 9, 2015 from 10:30 am to 11:30 am for a conversation with Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Money Fund, to discuss the future role of the International Monetary Fund in a fast-changing global economy. A keynote speech will be delivered by Madame Lagarde, and then Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe will moderate a conversation including questions from the audience.

Madame Lagarde will join the Atlantic Council before welcoming leading economic policymakers from across the world as they gather in Washington for the IMF’s annual spring meetings the next week. 

Despite the recent boost from cheaper oil and sustained US growth, global economic recovery is still impeded by high public debt, high unemployment, and insufficient public investment. As the great recession demonstrated, the role of the IMF is pivotal in navigating uneven economic growth patterns. Christine Lagarde will discuss how a strong IMF can reduce tensions among global players and support fragile economies for the benefit of the global community into the future.

April 9, 2015 from 10:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.
Atlantic Council
1030 15th St, NW
12th Floor (West Tower Elevators)

This event is open to the press and on the record.

by 趙永祥 2015-11-06 18:35:22, 回應(0), 人氣(247)


The Global Economic Outlook: 

A Conversation with IMF Managing Director 


Christine Lagarde


On June 4, Brookings webcasted a conversation with the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, on the global economic outlook and the policies needed for a full-speed global economy.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cfiCQ6JiQ9o
by 趙永祥 2015-11-06 16:50:55, 回應(0), 人氣(276)




Finance and Insurance Led Growth in the Second Quarter
Revised Statistics of Gross Domestic Product by Industry: 2012 through First Quarter 2015

Finance and insurance; professional, scientific, and technical services; and wholesale trade were the leading contributors to the increase in U.S. economic growth in the second quarter of 2015, according to statistics on the breakout of gross domestic product (GDP) by industry released today by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Overall, 18 of 22 industry groups contributed to the 3.9 percent increase in real GDP in the second quarter.

Chart of Real GDP and Real Value Added by Sector
  • Finance and insurance real value added—a measure of an industry’s contribution to GDP—increased 12.4 percent in the second quarter, after decreasing 3.8 percent in the first quarter. The second quarter growth primarily reflected an increase in Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and related activities.
  • Professional, scientific, and technical services increased 7.6 percent, after increasing 4.4 percent, primarily reflecting an increase in miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services, which includes industries like architectural and engineering services; scientific research and development services; and management consulting services.
  • Wholesale trade increased 8.4 percent, after decreasing 1.0 percent.
Chart of Real Value Added by Industry

Other highlights

  • Transportation and warehousing services increased 10.4 percent, after decreasing 15.6 percent in the first quarter. This was the largest increase in the industry group since the third quarter of 2010, and was primarily attributed to air transportation.
  • Construction increased 9.8 percent, after increasing 1.4 percent.
  • Mining decreased 17.9 percent, after increasing 15.2 percent. The second quarter decrease primarily reflected a decrease in the oil and gas extraction industry.

Gross output by industry

Real gross output—a measure of an industry's sales or receipts, which includes sales to final users in the economy (GDP) and sales to other industries (intermediate inputs)—increased in the second quarter. This reflected increases in real gross output for both the private goods- and services-producing sectors, as well as the government sector.

Chart of Real Value Added by Industry
  • Construction increased 23.5 percent, after increasing 5.7 percent in the first quarter. This was the eighth quarterly increase in the last nine quarters.
  • Professional, scientific, and technical services increased 4.0 percent, after decreasing 2.0 percent. The second quarter increase was primarily attributed to legal services.
  • Mining decreased 26 percent, after decreasing 9.7 percent. This was the third consecutive quarterly decrease, and was the largest decrease since the second quarter of 2009, reflecting decreases in both oil and gas extraction and support activities for mining.

Annual Revision of the Industry Economic Accounts

The estimates released today reflect the results of the annual revision of the industry economic accounts in conjunction with newly available statistics for GDP by industry for the second quarter of 2015. Additional information on this revision will be available in an article in the December 2015 issue of theSurvey of Current Business.

This year's annual revision includes revised estimates beginning with the first quarter of 2012. The revision incorporates source data that are more complete and reliable than those previously available. Major improvements introduced with this revision include:

  • Results from the 2015 annual revision of the national income and product accounts and international transactions accounts.
  • Incorporation of newly available and revised source data (e.g., Census Bureau's Service Annual Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, and the Department of Treasury's Statistics of Income).
  • Expansion of quarterly GDP by industry detail. Estimates of value added and gross output are now available in an underlying detail interactive data application for 71 industries.
  • Expansion of the annual components of value added. Estimates of net operating surplus are now available in an underlying detail excel file.
by 趙永祥 2015-10-16 16:57:35, 回應(0), 人氣(596)



JP Morgan Chase: 

Code of Ethics and Revisions Since the 2008 Financial Crisis

Date: September 10th, 2015 by Kara in Case Studies

IMG_2999

 










By: Daniel Strong

JPMorgan has an extensiveCode of Ethics, which appears to be well polished, written and executed. There are adequate policies designed to encourage compliance and whilst changes have only occurred to the Code of Conduct, they have been very positive in nature. Despite this, there appears to be no change in the frequency of ethical issues facing the company which suggests different types of intervention are needed.

There are three parts to this article. The first outlines relevant background information of JPMorgan, including its ongoing ethical and legal violations. The second section examines the current code of ethics adopted by the company, consisting of a Code of Conduct, a Code of Ethics and more restrictive codes for certain subsidiaries. While the codes have a distinct concern about the company’s reputation and legal compliance, they cover a wide variety of topics including human rights, the giving of gifts and intellectual property. This section also compares the current code of ethics to previous versions, noting one major change in the Code of Conduct in 2013. The third and final section explores how the code is implemented in practice and how compliance is encouraged including membership of certain organisations, the availability of reporting services and auditing measures.

Section I – Background Information

Headed by Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jamie Dimon, American based JPMorgan Chase & Co., was founded in 1799 by its predecessor company the Manhattan Company. It was the first billion dollar corporation in 1901 and has steadily grown over time, merging with and acquiring other companies including the Chase Manhattan Corporation, which is now included in the corporation’s name. The company is primarily concerned with finance related activities, including commercial banking, market services and investment banking (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2015a; JPMorgan Chase & Co 2015b)

The bank is one the largest companies in the world, ranked as the fourth largest public company by Forbes (Forbes 2014), and ranked thirteenth and fifty seventh in the Fortune 500 and Fortune Global 500 respectively. It owns around 2.4 trillion dollars’ worth of assets, making it comparable with some of the biggest banks in the world (Fortune 2014a; Fortune 2014b; Fortune 2015).

 

Banks by Assets

Figure 1: Forbes 2014

JP Morgan’s net income and revenue were 21.8 billion and 97.9 billion U.S dollars respectively in 2014 (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014a). To put this in perspective, the New Zealand government received and spent 89.4 billion and 92.2 billion New Zealand Dollars respectively in the same year (Treasury 2014). In US dollars this comes to about 67 and 69 billion U.S. dollars.

Possessing the kind of cash flows comparable to a modern state like New Zealand highlights the size of the corporation itself and the global economic influence JP Morgan is capable of wielding. Considering this, it is highly relevant how the company acts from an ethical standpoint.

Recent Ethical Issues

JPMorgan Chase & Co has been repeatedly involved in illegal and unethical behaviour since the global financial crisis of 2008 with no signs of remission. Some of these instances (but by no means all) are listed below.

  • February 2015: Two JPMorgan Chase & Co employees are charged for assisting an ‘aggravated breach of trust’ in selling risky products to the German city of Pforzheim and allegedly misleading the city council over the matter (Matussek 2014).
  • January 2015: JPMorgan Chase & Co along with Wells Fargo is charged by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Maryland Attorney General with running an ‘illegal marketing-services-kickback scheme’. Customers of the bank are being manipulated into using one particular company by at least six employees who were rewarded with cash and other assets for doing so. The penalties for this could cost the company $600,000 U.S. dollars (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2015).
  • November 2014: The Company, along with the Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC Bank, Citibank and UBS are collectively fined £2.6 billion pounds for rigging foreign exchange markets described as part of a ‘free for all culture’ (Treanor 2014).
  • July 2014: JPMorgan Chase & Co is fined $650,000 dollars for ‘repeatedly submitting inaccurate Large Trade Reports’ by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2014).
  • October 2013: The Company is ordered to pay a $100 million dollar penalty by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for ‘manipulative conduct’ in dumping large amounts of credit default swaps (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2013).
  • September 2013: The Securities and Exchange Commission fines JPMorgan Chase & Co $920 million for ‘misstating financial results’ and failing to implement controls to prevent their ‘traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses’ (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013)
  • August 2013: JPMorgan Chase & Co is ordered to pay $23 million dollars for the misuse of customer funds in buying Lehman Brothers notes in ‘reducing its own exposure’ despite having knowledge of company’s problems which preceded its bankruptcy (Stempel 2013). This after being fined an additional $20 million dollars earlier in April 2012 by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission for the same case (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2012a).
  • September 2012: JPMorgan Chase & Co is fined $600,000 dollars for exceeding speculative position limits trading on the InterContinental Exchange U.S (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2012c).
  • March 2012: JPMorgan Chase & Co is fined $140,000 dollars for a non-competitive and ‘fictitious’ ‘prearranged trade’ where a customer was allowed to trade on both sides of a transaction (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2012b).
  • July 2011: The Company is fined a total of $228 million for ‘rigging at least 93 municipal bond reinvestment transactions in 31 states’. This was achieved by illegally arranging to gain information on competitor’s positions (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2011).
  • November 2009: The Securities and Exchange Commission penalises the Company a combined total of $722 million dollars for conducting an ‘unlawful payment scheme’ where Jefferson County (Alabama) officials were paid in order to ‘win business and earn fees’ with the cost of the illegal payments passed onto the county in higher interest rates (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2009).
  • September 2009: The Company is fined $300,000 dollars for drawing upon customer funds breaching the separation of customer and firm funds, as well as failing to report this breach in a ‘timely’ manner (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2009). 

Section II – The Written Code

What can be considered JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s code of ethics contains both an employee Code of Conduct and an accompanying Code of Ethics. There are also further Codes of Ethics prescribed to particular subsidiaries.

Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct as of writing, is reasonably lengthy (49 pages) and covers the variety of topics with a noticeable degree of detail. The code is broken into five sections entitled ‘Our Heritage’, ‘A Shared Responsibility to Our Customers and the Marketplace’, ‘A Shared Responsibility to Our Company and Shareholders’, ‘A Shared Responsibility to Each Other’ and ‘A Shared Responsibility to Our Neighbourhoods and Communities’ (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014).

The first section ‘Our Heritage’ is a general introduction to the code, telling employees to ‘conduct business ethically and in compliance with the law everywhere we operate’ including co-operation with authorities, with the law to be upheld according to its ‘letter’ as well as its ‘spirit and intent’ (with employees expected to know all laws and regulations affecting them). The reach of the code itself is firmly established as a ‘term and condition of employment’ of all employees of the company, although there is a slightly ambiguous exception to any ‘separate legal entity’ which must first be approved as subject to the code. Employees are not only required to follow the code, but also report any others suspected of breaking it (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 2-9).

This section also sets out rules surrounding the use and dissemination of information. All information, both personal and company-related in nature is to be considered confidential and disclosed on a ‘need-to-know basis’. This includes disclosing information to family and friends, other parts of the company (with some exceptions) and information on previous employers (which should not be revealed to the company) (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 5-7).

The second section, ‘A Shared Responsibility to Our Customers and the Marketplace’ primarily deals with legal compliance. Relating to insider trading, It contains strict guidelines on the control of Material Non-Public Information (MNPI), with employees banned from trading in any accounts when they possess related MNPI and barred from passing this information along to anybody in any form unless with explicit approval. Furthermore, it restricts employees’ private trading activities from being ‘short term or speculative’, risky or outside an employee’s ‘financial means’ (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 11-13). Employees are also restricted from investing in clients or suppliers of the company, and must disclose companies they do hold securities in, if asked to conduct any business with them (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 14).

This focus on adherence to the law continues with employees required to comply with anti-tying laws, avoid and report any money-laundering activity, and to comply with economic sanctions placed by the United States and its allies as well as anti-boycott laws. With a company ‘commitment’ to antitrust laws employees cannot fix prices, conduct bid rigging or group boycotts, separate customers or territories or limit services to particular areas (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 15-16).

The offer or acceptance of bribes is also forbidden ‘if it is intended or appears intended to obtain some improper business advantage’ including bribes that are considered common in some countries to ‘expedite performance’. Third parties also are not to be asked to conduct any governmental or business dealings on behalf of the company (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 17).

The third section, ‘A Shared Responsibility to Our Company and Shareholders’ adds further limits on employee actions. It outlines the company’s policies on intellectual copyright, such that any business-related ideas ‘created in or outside work belongs to the company’ and employees must assist the company in enforcing this ownership (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 21).

Employees also are expected to handle information responsibly, with a particular focus on ‘accurate record keeping’, involving personal expenses etc. Employees must provide ‘complete, accurate, timely and understandable’ information to authorities and not ‘misrepresent or omit material facts’ (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 21-22).

The giving and receiving of gifts is given a lot of attention, with strict guidelines likely related to anti-bribery concerns. Gifts cannot be solicited in appreciation for good service or thanks or ‘as a tool to influence or reward’. Gifts must have some sort of ‘customary justification’ such as a weddings, or stationary with company advertising on it. If goods are perishable they must not be extravagant and must be shared with colleagues. Goods over the value of 100 U.S. dollars are not to be accepted. Some types of gifts are also explicitly prohibited such as straight cash or gift cards (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 26-28).

There are also some expected policies against romantic relationships, working with relatives, engaging in business transactions with families and friends as well as using company resources to access inappropriate material, gamble, install risky software etc. (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 20).

Previous limitations on personal finance are extended with the expectation employees conduct this activity with ‘responsibility’ and ‘integrity’. This includes acting as a guarantor for clients, customers or co-workers, avoiding any preferential treatment, acting as a personal fiduciary for anyone not family or a close friend, involvement with competitors, and the use of disreputable sources of loans (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 22-24). Employee lives are also addressed with restrictions on anything that could be regarded as a conflict of interest, representing the company unless ‘explicitly authorized’, putting not for profit activities ahead of their job, ensuring social media usage does not reflect on the company as well as a ‘pre-clearance’ requirement for public testimony, talking about their jobs, and speaking engagements (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 24; 28-30). This is on top of the requirement in the second section of the code that employees cannot encourage anyone to leave the company (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 15).

The fourth section, ‘A Shared Responsibility to Each Other’ continues the theme of restrictions on employee’s behaviour. Unsurprisingly it outlines zero tolerance for discrimination, the use of drugs or alcohol at work, bullying, violence and sexual harassment (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 33-35).

The final section ‘A Shared Responsibility to Our Neighbourhoods and Communities’, rather predictably governs employee behaviour in the community. A clear line is drawn regarding the company’s political involvement, with employees allowed to be politically involved but completely separate these activities from the company. Activities such as meetings with government officials need to be pre-approved (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 37-38). Although charitable work is not to interfere with their jobs, employees are encouraged to be involved in helping the community and being a ‘global citizen’, with the company expressing support for ‘environmental stewardship’ and human rights (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 38-40).

Focus of the Code of Conduct

The code itself seems to be based on two primary concerns: compliance with the law and the upholding of the company’s reputation. The first is demonstrated for instance, by the mention of antitrust laws, accurate record keeping and so forth. The second is underlined in a slightly more implicit manner, but still visible (particularly in the restrictions of employee’s behaviour). The clearest example of this is in the introductory letter from the company CEO Jamie Dimon. He mentions how employees should act with integrity not only because it is the moral thing to do but also because ‘it is essential to protecting our firm’s reputation’ reminding readers that ‘once a company’s reputation is harmed, the effects are enduring’ and that even ‘a perceived ethical transgression can permanently damage any company’ (JPMorgan 2014b: II)

Whilst the latter of these two concerns has little to do with ethics, it is an understandable position from a business perspective, although it does seem to be excessively stressed throughout the code. One does wonders whether this concern (and its strict requirements on employee behaviour) is driven by a negative public perception of financial institutions (and its knock-on effects on investors) in the wake of the global financial crisis and recent public relations disasters mentioned previously.

The first concern, adherence to the law, is a relevant ethical imperative, but it seems unwise to consider the law the ultimate judge of what is moral. In that case, what does the code have to say about ethics beyond the company’s legal requirements?

We can immediately discount ethical requirements of the code such as discrimination or bribery because although they are certainly morally justified, they are also required by law and do not give an unfiltered insight into the ethical commitment of JPMorgan.

However, some specific rules and interests could be considered ethical. Bans on some forms of bullying and activity at work that may not fall within the law, the promotion of human rights and environmental concerns (however vague) and political independence can be thought as ethical outside the confines of the law.

There are also some less specific but still relevant requirements of the code. Employees are told to act with ‘personal integrity’, to the ‘highest standards of ethical conduct’, to never manipulate people, to listen to feedback, to ‘treat others with dignity and respect’ and to act in a ‘fair, ethical and non-discriminatory manner’ (JPMorgan and Chase 2014b: 14; 35; 41). Whilst these could be considered vague, they are still important ethical ideas to promote.

Code of Ethics

The Code of Ethics is short and its requirements ‘supplement, but do not replace, the firm’s Code of Conduct’. Like the Code of Conduct, it is a ‘term and condition’ of employment. Although most of its contents is contained within the Code of Conduct itself, it instructs finance related employees to act in an ethical manner (specifically regarding conflicts of interest) and with full compliance to the law. It specifically targets compliance with regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission in filing ‘full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable disclosure in reports and documents.’ Employees are not to ‘coerce, manipulate’ or ‘mislead’ authorities. They also are told to ‘promptly report’ any violation of the code (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2015c).

Similar to the Code of Conduct, the Code of Ethics can be summed up well by its introductory objective in that its purpose is to (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2015c):

“Promote honest and ethical conduct and compliance with the law, particularly as related to the maintenance of the firm’s financial books and records and the preparation of its financial statements”

In other words, the Code of Ethics is primarily concerned with compliance with the law. As with the Code of Conduct this could have ethical and/or self-interested motivations. Considering all the content is already contained within the Code of Conduct, the Code of Ethics as a separate entity seems unnecessary unless its existence is to emphasis compliance with the law as a chief concern (which seems self-interested in motivation).

Subsidiaries

Further restrictions are placed on senior level employees of particular subsidiaries involved in financial markets. It is important to note that these specific codes are required by law, rather than being a company initiative. Some of the rules present in the Code of Conduct and the Code of Ethics are in these specific codes, but there are some additional ones. These employees are required to disclose all securities to the Compliance department as well as all transactions in which they are involved. Senior staff are subject to a minimum holding period of these securities and have a ‘special responsibility’ to ensure the confidentiality of customer’s information. Finally, they are required to keep accurate records including lists of code violations, present and previous codes and people with access to MNPI (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2007; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission n.d.).

Revisions to the Code Since the Global Financial Crisis

There appears to be few revisions to the codes described. The publication of a Code of Ethics is first mentioned in a Form 10-K submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission on 31st December 2003 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2003: 1). This is confirmed by its first findable presence on an Internet Archive snapshot (of the Company’s website) on the 24th April 2005 (Internet Archive 2015a). Other than a formatting change in 2010 (Internet Archive 2015b), the wording is completely identical.

There also are no apparent or accessible amendments to the specific subsidiary codes of ethics since the Global Financial Crisis.

There are however, four previous Code of Conducts dated May 2009, May 2010, April 2011 and June 2013. Although not stated, there seems to be a policy of annual revision. The content of all versions is similar but there are four important changes to note between 2009 and 2014 versions (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2009).

Firstly, the newest version is more polished, more articulate and better laid out. The refinements are noticeable by the addition of specific examples, decision trees and the added ability to report anonymously to an independent organisation through several methods (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b).

Secondly, there is more emphasis on general ethical values in the 2014 version. Treating customers correctly for example, is not explicitly mentioned in the oldest version. Furthermore, there is no mention of either environmental stewardship or an employees obligations to be a global citizen.

Thirdly, although the content is the same, the newest version is much more specific. In the oldest version there is no mention on the use of drugs and alcohol in the workplace, no mention of social media restrictions, no mention of common bribes made to expedite performance, no mention of the inclusion of EU and American sanctions, and clearer guidelines on harassment, which now include specific terms like ‘bullying’ and ‘sexual harassment’ (JPMorgan Chase & Co 2014b: 15-17; 33-34).

Finally, the general tone of the oldest Code of Conduct stresses less (although it is still present) on legal compliance and the protection of the company’s reputation. This may be due to the continued problems with issues of unethical behaviour associated with the company.

The changes between the five versions are as follows.

Code of Conduct Changes 2009 to 2010

Very minor revisions to the code, mostly formatting but does include the provision on social media usage (JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2010: 7).

Code of Conduct Changes 2010 to 2011

This could be best described as an amendment to the 2010 version, with the text being almost identical save for a few additional details. For example, there is now a sharp differentiation between U.S. Government officials, Non-U.S. Government officials, and employees in terms of bribery policy. Employees are also now restricted from investing in ‘private offered unregistered funds organized by the firm’. A summary and conclusion is added as well as an independent reporting service offered through email, telephone and fax (JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2010; JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2011: 4-27)

Code of Conduct Changes 2011 to 2013

The changes constitute most the revisions present between 2009 and 2014. The formatting of the document is changed and the options for employees to report code violations now includes a website alternative. Decision trees and specific examples are also added (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2013a).

Code of Conduct Changes 2013 to 2014.

The differences between 2013 and 2014 can be compared to the changes between 2010 and 2011, being superficial in nature by reformatting, rephrasing and streamlining the document. Some information is added, such as the differentiation between non-public information and MNPI (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014b: 11), and some are taken away, such as a diagram relating to information barriers (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014b: 13). The company’s statement on environmental issues is rephrased to perhaps appear slightly less committed, now stating a belief that ‘balancing environmental with financial priorities is fundamental’ (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014b: 39).

Section III – The Code in Practice

The rules described in a code of ethics mean nothing without some of form of implementation and encouragement to comply. As such it is prudent to ask what JPMorgan has done to achieve compliance. To start with, there are several methods outlined in the Code of Conduct itself, including its well laid out structure and explicit rules (which leave little room for unethical behaviour or misinterpretation).

The presence of a functioning and independent hotline (with explicit protection for whistle-blowers) able to accessed through fax, telephone, email and the internet (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014: 42) is an excellent method to encourage all-important whistle-blowers (Callaghan et al. 2012: 19).

JPMorgan Chase & Co. also encourages compliance through the availability of code specialists to every single employee (who are trained to give clarification on ethical matters), as well as mandatory annual affirmations of understanding, training sessions and severe punishments for breaches (including termination) (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014: 2-3). These training sessions and affirmations, if regarded as a ‘priming mechanism’ are useful in the context of promoting compliance (Davidson and Stevens 2013:71). The code also has been translated into several languages and ‘is available on the intranet’ to all employees (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014: 8).

JPMorgan Chase & Co. also implements the principles of its Code of Conduct, particularly environmental ones externally, being involved in the following organisations and agreements:

  1. Equator Principles: promotes minimum principles of ethical behaviour including the reporting of high greenhouse gas emitting projects and the implementation of labour standards (Equator Principles 2013; JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014c).
  2. Adoption of UN Declaration of Human Rights: (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014c)
  3. Carbon Principles: agreement to address carbon risks and try to meet energy needs in ‘an environmentally responsible and cost-effective manner’ (Credit Suisse 2015; JPMorgan 2014c)
  4. Green Bond Principles: Investment in environmentally forward thinking project (JPMorgan 2014c; International Capital Market Association 2015)
  5. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Full disclosure of payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to governments in order to prevent corruption and conflict (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 2015; JPMorgan 2014c)
  6. United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment: ‘Awareness of environmental, social and corporate governmental (ESG) issues’ (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014c; Principles for Responsible Investment 2015).
  7. Ceres Company Network: Promotion of environmental and social responsibility (Ceres 2015; JPMorgan 2014c).
  8. The Wolfsburg Principles: Advancement of robust financial frameworks and activities such as money laundering and corruption (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2014c; Wolfsburg Principles 2015).

The regularly published Environmental and Social Policy Framework also includes specific bans on activities related to child labour, forced labour, resource exploitation on world heritage sites, illegal logging and companies that have no policies against uncontrolled or illegal use of fire in forestry (JPMorgan 2014c: 5-6). Enhanced review processes are also required for certain activities such as hydraulic fracturing (fracking), oil and gas projects, and any business related to palm oil (JPMorgan 2014c: 7-8). Periodic internal audits of policies are conducted to ensure compliance as well as annual environmental sustainability and corporate responsibility reports (JPMorgan & Chase 2014c: 20)

Additionally, the 2013 ‘How We Do Business’ report makes the following claims:

  • 16,000 employees added to ‘support our regulatory, compliance and control efforts’ as well as a million hours of training related to these activities (JPMorgan & Chase 2013b: 27).
  • Additional 2 billion dollar budget increase for regulatory and control issues as well as 1.7 billion spent on technology related to these activities (JPMorgan & Chase 2013b: 27).
  • The Establishment of a firm wide Risk Committee, a firm wide Fidiciary Risk Committee and a firm wide Control Committee in 2012 and 2013 (JPMorgan & Chase 2013b: 28).

Independent audits of the company are also conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2015d).

Breaches of the Code of Conduct can result in both reduction of compensation and retroactive retrieval of salaries and bonuses (including equities) even if employees have left the firm, known as claw black provisions (J.P. Morgan 2014d: 25;44-45) . A prime example of this being applied is action taken against employees involved in the market manipulation for which the company was fined in October 2013 (Heineman 2012).

Success or Failure?

Despite these efforts there are undoubtedly ongoing issues within the company, even though the unethical behaviour the company (or its employees) is involved in is clearly forbidden by the code of ethics described. Despite the apparently genuine drive to enforce the code, these efforts don’t appear to have made any difference in reducing these problems. This perhaps reveals cultural tendencies within the institution that are proving difficult to change and that a code of ethics is inadequate in creating an ethical culture. Determining what other methods can be taken outside of a code of ethics should be regarded as an important extension and an opportunity for research.

Not all blame can be placed on JPMorgan however, with its independent auditor fined £1.4 million pounds for failing to conduct its audits properly which would have prevented some the misconduct described (White 2012).

Unchanged code, improved implementation, same culture?

Overall the JP Morgan’s Code of Ethics contains a distinguishing focus on legal compliance and protecting the company’s reputation which complicates an ethical evaluation of the codes.

The revisions to the code itself were either non-existent or minor apart from the significant amendment to the Code of Conduct in 2013, which added much more detail and improved formatting. The implementation of the Code shows JPMorgan Chase & Co. is making noticeable efforts to advance implementation and encourage compliance including an important and easily accessible independent whistle-blowing tool.

Yet, when these efforts are compared to the ongoing ethical problems listed in the first section, it appears the improvements are not sufficient to prevent unethical and damaging behaviour within the institution itself. This suggests more and potentially different types of initiatives are required.


Website linkage

http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/jpmorgan-chase-code-of-ethics-and-revisions-since-the-2008-financial-crisis

 


References

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Charges of Unlawfully Handling Customer Segregated Funds. 2012a. [Online]. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Available: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6225-12 [7 February 2015].

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Prearranged Trade on the CBOT. 2012b. [Online]. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Available: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6198-12 [7 February 2015].

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Futures Speculative Position Limits. 2012c. [Online]. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Available: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6369-12 [7 February 2015].

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Manipulative Conduct In Connection with “London Whale” Swaps Trades. 2013. [Online]. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Available: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6737-13 [7 February 2015].

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Reports and Imposes a 650,000 Civil Monetary Penalty. 2014. [Online]. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Available: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6968-14 [7 February 2015].

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[Online]. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Available: http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-wells-fargo-and-jpmorgan-chase-for-illegal-mortgage-kickbacks/ [7 February 2015].

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Confidence? An Experimental Study. Accounting Review, 88(1): 51-75.

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Matusseek, K. 2015. [Online]. JPMorgan Bankers Charged over $64 Million in Swap-Sale Losses.

Bloomberg. Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-09/two-bankers-charged-in-germany-over-swap-sale-to-pforzheim [7 February 2015].

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Stempel, J. 2013. [Online]. JPMorgan in $23 million settlement with clients over Lehman. Reuters.

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Treanor, J. 2014. [Online]. Foreign exchange fines: banks handed £2.6bn in penalties for market

rigging. The Guardian. Available: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/12/foreign-exchange-fines-ubs-hsbc-citibank-jp-morgan-rbs-penalties-market-rigging [27 January 2015].

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[Online]. The Treasury. Available: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/government/financialstatements/yearend/jun14/fsgnz-year-jun14-1.pdf [3 February 2015].

Code of Ethics. n.d. [Online]. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Available:

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 Form 10-K. 2003. [Online]. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Available:

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Code of Ethics. 2007. [Online]. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Available:

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908186/000090818608000032/ex-jpmcodeofethics.htm [13 February 2015].

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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Available: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-232.htm [13 February 2015].

SEC Charges J.P. Morgan Securities with Fraudulent Bidding Practices Involving Investment of

Municipal Bond Proceeds. 2011. [Online]. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Available: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-143.htm [13 February 2015].

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[Online]. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Available: http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539819965#.VOK4yS4fsxs [7 February 2015].

White, A. 2012. [Online]. PwC fined record £1.4m over JP Morgan audit. The Telegraph. Available:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/supportservices/8995981/PwC-fined-record-1.4m-over-JP-Morgan-audit.html [16 February 2015].

Wolfsburg Principles. 2015. [Online]. Wolfsburg Principles. Available: http://www.wolfsberg-

 

by 趙永祥 2015-10-16 16:49:32, 回應(0), 人氣(238)


Global Risks



77% of economists believe that the economy is more likely to do worse than their forecasts, than better. Here’s what they see as the key sources of risk:


http://projects.wsj.com/econforecast/#qa=1444248821524




http://projects.wsj.com/econforecast/#qa=1444248821524

by 趙永祥 2015-10-16 16:46:20, 回應(1), 人氣(490)


Economist Q&A

Forecast Edition: October 2015

Economic Indicators


GDP (quarterly)

  • 7 yr.
  • 5 yr.
  • 3 yr.
Actual
Estimates
Q112Q2Q3Q4Q113Q2Q3Q4Q114Q2Q3Q4Q115Q2Q3Q4Q116Q2Q3Q40 %5 %-5 %10 %
Share view:
GDP (quarterly)
Actual (Q2 2015)
3.9%
Projected: Q3 2015
2.0%
Projected: Q4 2015
2.7%
Projected: Q1 2016
2.5%
Projected: Q2 2016
2.7%
Projected: Q3 2016
2.6%
Projected: Q4 2016
2.6%
http://projects.wsj.com/econforecast/#ind=gdp&r=20


http://projects.wsj.com/econforecast/#ind=gdp&r=20
by 趙永祥 2015-08-04 05:33:39, 回應(0), 人氣(510)

The latest euro-area unemployment condition
long-term unemployment in the euro area is high


The latest euro-area unemployment figures, released on July 31st, make for mildly happy reading. They show the overall unemployment rate has crept down to 11.1% from its peak of 12.1% in April 2013. Despite the good news, another problem in the form of long-term unemployment (generally defined as being out of work for over 12 months) has emerged in the nineteen-member currency union. Of the 19m jobless Europeans, more than half have not worked for the last year. And over 15% have not had a job for more than four years. Unsuprisingly, the problem is most severe in southern Europe where a protacted crisis pushed up overall unemployment, and with it long-term joblessness. But in contrast the number of people who have been looking for work for a long time in America fell when its economy recovered; the long-term joblessness rate now sits slightly above 20% of the total. So why is it so tough for Europeans to get back to work?

Part of the reason lies in labour mobility. Almost 30% of Americans reside in a different state to the one in which they were born. But a mere 2.8% of Europeans have moved to a different country in the EU. Language barriers, cultural differences and non-transferable qualifications make it much harder for them to upsticks to find a new job. Generous unemployment benefits in Europe also tie would-be workers to one place and make getting work less urgent. In most American states jobless workers qualify for only 26 weeks of unemployment benefits (though this was increased between 2008 and 2013). Many euro-area countries support the unemployed for more than a year.

Another factor in the divergent long-term unemployment rates is a higher job turnover in America than in Europe. Numbers from the International Labour Organisation, a UN body, suggest that between 2008 and 2012 the probability of moving into employment within the next month was around 7% for Europeans and 12% for Americans. And the chances losing your job within the next month was 0.8% and 1%, respectively. The quicker churn means available work is spread out among the population so skills are kept sharper and spirits higher. It is not all bad news for the euro area, though. One cause of the differing joblessness rate is actually a symptom of a healthier labour market in Europe. Unemployment is falling in America partly because discouraged workers are dropping out of the labour force. In Europe the opposite is true: the workforce has actually grown, which pushes up unemployment rates.

But all this bodes ill for single currency. Long-term unemployment can be self-sustaining: the longer someone is out of work the harder it is to get back in. Other difficulties arise too. Fertility rates, already falling in Europe, tend to drop off and life expectancy can decline when joblessness rates are high. The problem is not universal though. 

Denmark and Germany have kept both long-term and overall unemployment low through job training programmes, flexible labour laws and education. 

Southern European countries, where the problem is worst, should look north for inspiration.

Dr. Chao

4-August-2015

by 趙永祥 2015-08-04 05:29:47, 回應(0), 人氣(528)

The Greeks are not taking ownership of bail-out reforms

Since Greece and its European creditors reached a deal to keep the country from defaulting out of the euro zone in early July, two questions have loomed over Athens. The first is whether the Greeks will, or can, implement their end of an agreement that redoubles the very austerity measures the far-left Syriza government campaigned against. The second is whether trying to do so will fracture Syriza and bring down the government. Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister, prevailed over the rebellious hard-left faction in his party at a tense meeting of the Syriza’s central committee on July 30th, but the threat of a rupture remains.

The 200-member committee approved the prime minister's proposal to hold an extraordinary party congress in September. By that time, he hopes, the details of Greece's new €86 billion ($94 billion) bail-out—the country’s third—will have been agreed. But his earlier suggestion that Syriza should hold a referendum of party members immediately on whether to continue the bail-out negotiations was dropped. The key opponent was Panayotis Lafazanis (pictured at right), a former official in Greece’s Communist Party who was dumped as energy minister in a cabinet reshuffle earlier this month, and who leads Syriza’s mutinous Left Platform faction.



Holding an extraordinary congress would clear the way for Mr Tsipras to call an early election by the end of the year to consolidate his power. But it risks triggering a split with Left Platform. "The premier bought some time tonight, but that was all ," said one participant in Thursday's meeting. At one point Mr Lafazanis mocked the prime minister by comparing his referendum proposal to the national referendum held July 5th, in which most Greeks rejected a bail-out plan that had been offered by the European Commission—only to see Mr Tsipras accept a new rescue package on harsher terms a week later. "How many referenda are we going to have?” asked Mr Lafazanis. “We've already staged one and we won with 62% of the vote."






Mr Lafazanis and his supporters—believed to include about 40% of the central committee and some 30 out of Syriza's 149 MPs—insist that a Grexit from the euro is feasible, despite the threat that a deep devaluation and high inflation could push Greece further into recession. The new currency, Mr Lafazanis argued at the meeting, could be backed by the roughly €35 billion that Greeks hold in cash, an amount that has swelled as many citizens have withdrawn their savings from the country’s precarious banks.

Left Platform is expected to keep up the pressure on Mr Tsipras. Its lawmakers defected in two parliamentary votes on "prior actions", reforms demanded by Greece’s creditors as a condition for a €7.2 billion bridge loan to pay creditors this month. That left the government dependent on the votes of pro-European opposition parties. More votes loom in the next two weeks. The government still hopes that bail-out negotiations can be completed by August 12th, and an aid tranche disbursed in time to make a €3.2 billion repayment to the European Central Bank on August 20th. But that timetable looks overly optimistic, given that the so-called "quadriga" of bailout monitors from the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism (the EU's own bailout fund) arrived in Athens only this week.

Even before the negotiations got properly underway, signs of new dissension between Greece and its creditors were beginning to emerge. The Syriza-led government insists it will only implement reforms specifically included in the bail-out Mr Tsipras agreed to at the EU summit, while the quadriga has lined up a series of additional measures. Some of the quadriga's demands are unpopular but necessary. Further cuts are urgently needed to keep the loss-making state pension system from collapsing by 2025. And it would be logical for Greek farmers to pay the same 26% profit tax as other businesses rather than the 13% they pay now, especially since the lower rate has led thousands of Greeks to define themselves dubiously as “farmers”.

A second bridge loan is already being considered by EU officials. It would require parliament to approve yet more prior actions. The most controversial, which Mr Tsipras has already accepted, would be to roll back measures passed earlier this year by Syriza that reversed structural reforms implemented during Greece's two previous bail-outs. The government has been rehiring some of the public-sector workers it fired under those reforms, including the 1,300-strong Athens municipal police force abolished two years ago as part of a sweeping overhaul of the civil service. Fines imposed on taxpayers in arrears were slashed; taxpayers were allowed to pay debts owed to the state over many as 100 instalments.

Conclusion

Those measures eased the pressure on cash-strapped Greeks and cut across party political boundaries. Even the pro-European opposition might balk at repealing them. Numerous European officials and analysts have warned that for any new bail-out to work, Greece must “take ownership” of its reform programme. So far Athens seems to be acting less like the owner of the reforms than a reluctant tenant.

Dr. Chao 

4-August-2015

by 趙永祥 2015-05-19 11:39:43, 回應(0), 人氣(561)


Why the world is addicted to debt? 


The good that finance can do, Business this week



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by 趙永祥 2015-04-20 06:30:52, 回應(0), 人氣(503)

A New Global Financial Architecture-Asian Infrastructure Investment BankAIIB)

As the pathways to a second Asian miracle are constructed, it is probably apparent by now that increased global liquidity—when financial leverage is properly targeted—fosters investment, reduces unemployment, and perceptibly augments the limited resources of the once towering World Bank. It should also be noteworthy that infrastructural advances come with social costs (externalities) that are not directly paid for by some financial intermediaries. Will investments be smart enough to minimize external costs and assuage fears of urbanization and its accompanying environmental degradation? 

Economists will correctly argue that investments in capital must be undertaken when investments are susceptible to increasing rather than negative returns. That is, when the rates of return are positive, especially in capital-scarce countries. Yet, if the calculus of rates of return is misleading and social costs are beyond the mandate of financial architects, who will pay for the social costs that are facilitated by new financial architects? Will the World Bank be confronted with a new asymmetry of increasing responsibility and scarce resources when the beneficiaries of leverage are poorer countries? 

Alternatively, will investors be smart enough to eliminate white elephant projects and social costs by engaging in critical countervailing acts that balance infrastructural development against the inevitable social costs of development. Organizations that lack supranational authority or a multiplicity of mandates face significant limitations and pose some social risks. 

One thing is clear; the global economy is rapidly expanding and the global financial arrangements of the past (status quo) require extraordinary managerial acumen and compromise to deal with uneasy geopolitical tensions and illiquidity challenges. 

Dr. Chao Yuang Shiang 
18-April-2015


by 趙永祥 2015-04-08 16:28:31, 回應(0), 人氣(488)


I                                                IMF Hot website

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by 趙永祥 2015-03-19 09:56:32, 回應(0), 人氣(526)


Maria Bartiromo, the Money Honey, on the Sound Bite Culture  from LinkedIn Pulse







Published on Mar 11, 2015

Read the full post here: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/changing-world-money-honey-daniel-roth 

Earlier this week, Verizon removed the Weather Channel from its FIOS TV lineup, saying that the channel was no longer necessary now that “customers are increasingly accessing weather information not only from their TV but from a variety of online sources and apps.” Who needs weather programming when it’s on-demand on your phone anywhere? And with that, the channel was gone — a “decision, not a dispute,” as a spokesperson called it. 

Maria Bartiromo saw a similar dynamic playing out when she was at CNBC, where for 20 years she face of business news, grilling executives about earnings misses as a ticker scrolled beneath her. She had been at the cutting edge in how the markets were covered: the first reporter to broadcast from the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, the first to report what the banks were saying in their morning calls. But by 2013, she realized that a major shift had occurred — and wasn’t sure why no one was admitting it. 

The issue: the markets had turned mobile and ever-present, with everyone checking on stocks from wherever they were, not from the scrolling ticker. She wasn’t riding this trend, she was being asked to ignore it. Her managers, she says, wanted her to put more people on screen and for less time — focus on sound bites, give the audience even more of what they used to love, but faster. 

“I felt that we were programming to the trading desk, programming to the knee-jerk reaction,” she says. “That worked. It worked really well in the '90s, because that's what was the environment… Today, there's a lot of information out there. And you really do not need more talking heads saying the same thing.” 

Bartiromo decamped to Fox, where she became the global markets editor and a constant presence. She hosts the morning show every weekday on Fox Business News and a Sunday morning show on Fox News. The days start early and the only day off is Saturday. So while the shows are slower paced with more interviews — “more perspective, and more analysis,” she says — her pace hasn’t done anything but increase. (So far, the style has been enough to keep the show in the top 120 of cable news shows, but not enough to top her old network.) 

After one morning’s show, she dropped by LinkedIn to talk about the changes all around her. Changes to her career and to the business world since she started covering it. 

by 趙永祥 2015-03-18 00:00:32, 回應(0), 人氣(633)

         Three main tactical approaches to maintain monetary stability

                                            By Dr. Chao Yuang Shiang


Monetary policy uses three main tactical approaches to maintain monetary stability:

  • Money supply. The first tactic manages the money supply. This mainly involves buying government bonds (expanding the money supply) or selling them (contracting the money supply). In the Federal Reserve System, these are known as open market operations, because the central bank buys and sells government bonds in public markets. Most of the government bonds bought and sold through open market operations are short-term government bonds bought and sold from Federal Reserve System member banks and from large financial institutions. When the central bank disburses or collects payment for these bonds, it alters the amount of money in the economy while simultaneously affecting the price (and thereby the yield) of short-term government bonds. The change in the amount of money in the economy in turn affects interbank interest rates.

  • Money demand. The second tactic manages money demand. Demand for money, like demand for most things, is sensitive to price. For money, the price is the interest rates charged to borrowers. Setting banking-system lending or interest rates (such as the US overnight bank lending rate, the federal funds discount Rate, and the London Interbank Offer Rate, or Libor) in order to manage money demand is a major tool used by central banks. Ordinarily, a central bank conducts monetary policy by raising or lowering its interest rate target for the interbank interest rate. If the nominal interest rate is at or very near zero, the central bank cannot lower it further. Such a situation, called a liquidity trap,can occur, for example, during deflation or when inflation is very low.

  • Banking risk. The third tactic involves managing risk within the banking system. Banking systems use fractional reserve banking to encourage the use of money for investment and expanding economic activity. Banks must keep banking reserves on hand to handle actual cash needs, but they can lend an amount equal to several times their actual reserves. The money lent out by banks increases the money supply, and too much money (whether lent or printed) will lead to inflation. Central banks manage systemic risks by maintaining a balance between expansionary economic activity through bank lending and control of inflation through reserve requirements.

These three approaches -- open-market activities, setting banking-system lending or interest rates, and setting banking-system reserve requirements to manage systemic risk -- are the "normal" methods used by central banks to ensure an adequate money supply to sustain and expand an economy and to manage or limit the effects of recessions and inflation. 

These "standard" supply, demand, and risk management tools keep market interest rates and inflation at specified target values by balancing the banking system's supply of money against the demands of the aggregate market.

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